



AGARD

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ST/2/92/3

19 May 1993

Memorandum to Authors of Papers for the AGARD Technical Information Panel (TIP) Specialists' Meeting to be held on Wednesday and Thursday, 6-7 October, 1993, Ottawa, Canada.

First, I should like to thank all of you for providing the brief account of the intended contents of your Paper for this meeting, as requested in my earlier letter. They were reviewed recently by the Panel, and no changes have been suggested.

At the same time the Meeting Programme was confirmed, and I enclose a copy of the final schedule. I will send you the formal Meeting Announcement in a few weeks time.

If you have not yet completed the Author Information Sheet I sent you earlier, please do so and return it to me as soon as possible so that we may know what visual equipment you need.

If you need equipment other than an overhead or 35 mm projector you must let me know in advance, as we may not be able to arrange it at short notice.

As I said in my letter of 27 November, it is my job to help you in connection with the meeting, and in particular, to see that your Paper is published after the Meeting, in the official Conference Proceedings. In order to do this I need your help as follows:

Please have your Paper prepared in camera-ready form either on AGARD's special Camera-Ready sheets or on A4 or 8½ by 11 paper, in accordance with the instructions I sent you earlier. I believe you already have the camera-ready sheets. Please try not to exceed 15 sheets. If you wish to print on A4 or 8½ x 11 paper, the following information, which is applicable to Postscript, may help:

<u>Margins</u>	<u>Top/Bottom</u>	<u>Left/Right</u>
A4 paper:	0.8" (20 mm)	0.8" (20 mm)
8½ x 11 paper:	0.5" (12.5 mm)	0.9" (23 mm)

Font: Times Roman 10

Columns: Two, separated by 0.3" (7.6 mm)

Line spacing: 0.9

A sample page printed in this format is attached.

To meet our printing deadlines, I will need to receive this material here at AGARD Headquarters

BEFORE 1 NOVEMBER 1993

Please remember to telephone or fax me if you find yourself unable to meet this date.

Please ensure that the Clearance Certificate I sent you earlier is completed and returned to me along with your typed Paper. Do not leave this Certificate until the last minute; it can take several weeks to get it approved by your national authority. UK authors must send it to the address shown on the back of the certificate and US authors must send it to Ms. Gladys Cotter, whose address is:

Chief
NASA Scientific and Technical
Information Program
NASA Headquarters (Code JTT)
Washington DC 20546

As I said previously it would help participants to follow your presentation if they have a copy of your paper, with its illustrations. Please either bring 80 copies with you or send them to arrive by 30 September to:

Michael Brandreth
Manager, Policy, Planning and Systems
Canada Institute for Scientific and
Technical Information
National Research Council Canada
Ottawa, Canada K1A 0S2

Mark the package "For TIP Symposium 6/7 October"

To avoid problems with the customs authorities, the package should be labelled "Papers for AGARD/TIP Symposium. No commercial value". Please use a recognised air freight company such as TNT or DHL who will guarantee door-to-door delivery, to save you having to collect them from the airport.

As regards the presentation of Papers, the meeting schedule allows twenty minutes for this followed by twenty minutes for a discussion of the Paper, in which the audience participates along with the Session Chairman and the specially appointed Reviewers.

The Technical Information Panel tries to maintain a high standard in the presentation of Papers at its meetings. Just four points in particular:

- Please do not read word for word from your Paper;
- If there are acronyms or abbreviations in your text, do explain them the first time they are mentioned. (This applies to both the written text and the oral presentation of your Paper.)

- Be sure your visual aids are clear, concise and have sufficiently large characters to be legible in a large auditorium (a minimum height of 5 mm is recommended).

General information about Ottawa, including details of accommodation, will be sent shortly.

Please do not hesitate to contact me if you have any problems. I wish you luck with your preparation work and look forward to meeting you in October.

Yours sincerely,



G.W.Hart
Technical Information
Panel Executive

Copies:	Meeting Director)	
	Theme Coordinator)	(With meeting
	National Panel Coordinators of)	schedule only)
	countries providing Authors)	

Attachments:

1. Meeting schedule
2. Sample page

**INTERNATIONAL HIGH SPEED NETWORKS FOR
SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL INFORMATION**

to be held in Ottawa, Canada, on Wednesday and Thursday, 6 and
7 October 1993

WEDNESDAY 6 OCTOBER 1993

0830-0930 REGISTRATION

0900-0910 BRIEFING (Session Chairmen, Authors, Reviewers,
Interpreters, Technicians) in the auditorium.

0930-1000 OPENING CEREMONY

Brief welcome by the Canadian National Delegate to
AGARD and the National Librarian of Canada

The timing arrangements for the presentation and discussion of papers are as follows: Twenty minutes are allocated for the presentation of each paper, and approximately twenty minutes will be allowed in each Session for the discussion of each paper either after the individual papers or at the end of the Session. This discussion, which will be led by the Reviewers named below, has, as its main objective, maximum audience participation.

SESSION I. OVERVIEW

Chairman: Mr M. Brandreth (CA)
Reviewers: Mr T. Hermann (US)
 Mr J. Sterken (BE)

1000-1045 1. **Global Information Networks: An Introduction
to the Internet and its Services**
Mr. G. Cleveland, National Library of Canada

1045-1115 BREAK

1115-1200 2. **Global Information Networks - How they work**
Mr. A. Bodini, ESA/ESRIN, Italy

1200-1330 LUNCH

SESSION II. MANAGEMENT

Chairman: Mr B. Hisinger (DE)
Reviewers: Mr A. Tan (NE)
 Mr P. Ryan (US)

1330-1415 3. **Regulatory Issues**
Mr. D. MacKinnon, Software Kinetics, Canada

1415-1500 4. **Standards for Data and Document Interchange**
Author to be nominated

1500-1530 BREAK

1530-1615 5. **Virtual Library**
Ms. G. Cotter and Ms. J. Hunter, NASA, United
States

1615-1700 6. **Problems of International Exchange of
Scientific and Technical Information for a
Russian Aerospace Research Institute (TsAGI)**
Mr. V. Tyurin, Deputy Director, Central Aero-
hydrodynamics Institute (TsAGI), Russia

THURSDAY 7 OCTOBER

SESSION III. APPLICATIONS AND CASE STUDIES

Chairman: Ms. A.M. Correia (PO)
Reviewers: Mrs. F. Lhullier (FR)
 Mr. R. Searle (UK)
 Mr. M. Walshaw (UK)

0830-0915 7. **Electronic Document Delivery - Towards the Virtual Library**

Mr. M. Brandreth, Canada Institute for
Scientific and Technical Information

0915-1000 8. **The Supply of Electronic Documents in Europe (INIST's Experience)**

Mr. C. Lupovici, INIST, France

1000-1030 BREAK

1030-1115 9. **Electronic Journals**

Dr. C. McKnight, HUSAT Research Institute,
United Kingdom

1115-1200 10. **Bulletin Boards, Electronic Mail, Conferencing. Current use by Scientists and Engineers; Effects on Libraries and Information Centers - Do they have a role?**

Mr. V. Castelo Gutierrez, CSIC, Spain

1200-1330 LUNCH

1330-1415 11. **Virtual Training and Support System**

Mr. Guy Langlois, CAE Electronics Ltd., Canada

SESSION IV. THE FUTURE

Chairman: Mr. P. Hoogenberk (NE)
Reviewers: Mrs. R. Gjersvik (NO)
 Dr. J.M. Hughes (US)

1415-1500 12. **Wide Area Information Servers: An Executive Information System for Unstructured Files**

Mr. B. Kahle, Wide Area Information Servers
(WAIS), United States

1500-1530 BREAK

1530-1615 13. **Information Retrieval Services on Wide Area Networks: A Vision of the Future**

Mr. Jean Le Mezec, France Telecom Inc., France

1615-1745 **SESSION V.** FORUM DISCUSSION

Mr. M. Schryer
Mr. C. Bigger

Overview of Political Changes in the International Scene

by

Jamie Shea

Policy Planning Section, Political Affairs Directorate
NATO Headquarters
B-1110 Brussels
Belgium

When the British author Joyce Cary was asked why he had joined the Balkan Wars of 1912, he replied that he had not wanted to miss the experience of war, since he had thought that this would be the last of all wars. Looking at the situation in the Balkans 80 years later, one cannot help but remark with great sadness that Mr. Cary's assumption was excessively optimistic.

True, the Cold War is thankfully over, but the new environment is far less benign than we had hoped. We have overcome the old order, but a new, stable order has not yet been established. The Cold War is behind us, but in the Balkans a hot war is being conducted. We have overcome the political division of Europe, but regrettably our continent is still divided into two distinct halves: one which is secure and moving, even with the occasional setback, towards integration and that which is less secure and prone to ethnic conflicts and disintegration.

Historians who favour the cyclical rather than the linear approach to their subject will be at home in this new Europe. The great themes of the closing years of the 19th century are back: the Balkan powder keg, the Eastern Question and the onslaught of irredentism against externally stabilising but internally weak multi-ethnic states. It seems ironic that half-forgotten names, like Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia and Sarajevo, that determined the beginning of the 20th century are also accompanying its end, or that the statesmen of today, should be preoccupied with the same diplomatic dilemmas as Bismarck, Disraeli and Andrassy:

- What are the dangers that regional conflicts pose to our national security?
- Is it less dangerous to appease aggressors than resist them?
- Where should we intervene and how?
- Where do we draw the line between advocating territorial change and upholding the status quo?
- Which principles does our common security require us to uphold, universally and by force, if necessary?

During the Cold War the Western Allies had a clear objective: to deter and, if necessary, defend against attack. To do so successfully, we developed the appropriate military planning and means. Today, fortunately our borders and people are no longer under threat. But as a result, however, the definition of what are one's vital interests has become more complicated. In

the case of conflicts taking place beyond our borders and posing no direct threat to our survival, it is more difficult to define clear and realistic political objectives and the most effective means to achieve them.

There can be no doubt that the international community, and the EC and the United States in particular, have so far not been able to find a successful balance between ends and means in their handling of the Yugoslav crisis. Should we therefore conclude that our vision of a new international order is unrealistic? Should we abandon our efforts to build a new security order in Europe? Have all the international organisations failed? Has NATO become irrelevant? Is there any chance for us to be able to prevent and manage crises successfully?

These are valid questions to which we must respond. We must start by recognising that there is no pre-determined pattern of history whereby certain events or geo-political situations are destined to repeat themselves every so often. Only those who do not learn from history are condemned to repeat it. We know that many earlier aggressors could have been halted by a timely display of determination by the international community. So deterrence is still a valid basis of security even after the Cold War. In the world of instant communications, economic interdependence and porous frontiers in which we live today, we can even less than in the past quarantine regional conflicts and go about our business as if they would not affect our daily lives in the least.

Moreover, we have the institutions and instruments that are necessary to secure the peace in Europe. They are already there as the building blocks of a new European and world order. There is no alternative to our Alliance's vision of a European security system based on a dynamic interaction between the major institutions; the Alliance, the EC, the CSCE, the WEU and increasingly also the United Nations as it plays a more important role in peacemaking in Europe.

The only alternative to such an approach would be if there were a single power willing and able to provide leadership in all the crisis situations we are facing and will face in the future. But the only conceivable candidate for such a role, namely the United States, is clearly unable and unwilling to assume this task, even if its active engagement in world affairs and leadership remain essential.

It is also evident that nations seeking to intervene in a regional crisis require the moral support and mandate of either the UN or the CSCE. It is also vital in sustaining

public opinion for the burdens and sacrifices that any intervention may necessitate.

Working through the institutions is also the best formula to secure burden-sharing. It is important, politically as well as materially, that those who do not participate directly in any action at least contribute in other ways.

Finally, we cannot delegate all tasks to the global security organisation, the UN. It is overburdened and under-funded. Its responsibilities in the Third World are increasing even more than in Europe. So it will look increasingly to regional structures and will discourage them from giving up too early or too easily.

However essential this framework of interlocking institutions seems in theory, critics have nonetheless questioned its ability to function in practice. They fear that this concept focuses too much on the prerogatives of individual institutions: producing at best duplication as each institution hankers for its slice of the action or, at worst, paralysis as each institution tries to ensure its precedence over the others.

A future European security system is not, however, something that will just happen - not without a certain process of trial and error as we search for the best formula. Our concept of interlocking institutions has in this respect only just begun to take shape. It will take time for us to make it function properly. Setbacks are unavoidable. NATO, the most successful Alliance in history, was not created overnight or without some hard negotiation either. I do not draw the conclusion that we should abandon our efforts but rather that we have to redouble them. In particular, we must reinforce the operational links and practical interplay among these institutions. They must become accustomed to working together and more aware of the specific contribution to the common endeavour that each institution can and must make. So NATO will have to play its part in overcoming the obstacles that have hampered the smooth interaction of these institutions.

First, the Alliance will have to establish closer links to the UN. Mr Boutros Ghali in his "Agenda for Peace" and letter to the CSCE, has welcomed the role of regional organisations in upholding UN decisions. At the same time, the habit of cooperation and looking to each other for guidance has yet to be established at the working level. In particular, our Alliance's contingency planning in support of UN peacekeeping operations has to be as closely modelled as possible on likely UN requirements and anticipate UN decisions.

Second, we must continue to support the CSCE. Over the past three years NATO has taken a number of initiatives to give the CSCE not only additional responsibilities but also new institutional means to implement them. Our London and Rome Summit Declarations contained many concrete proposals, for instance the establishment of the Committee of Senior Officials and the Conflict Prevention Centre, which the CSCE has subsequently adopted. We have supported CSCE designating itself as a regional organisation under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. We have assisted its observer mission to Nagorno-Karabak. Most importantly of all we have now offered our Alliance's resources and

expertise in support of CSCE peacekeeping operations. So as the CSCE increases its authority in the field of conflict prevention and the peaceful settlement of disputes, its interaction with NATO is bound to grow.

Third, we are establishing a new relationship with the Western European Union. It is obvious that a strong Atlantic pillar in our Alliance has to be balanced by a strong European pillar. There will be situations in which the United States prefers Europe to take the lead. The Yugoslav crisis has been a case in point. So there is a clear need for an effective WEU that can implement the common foreign and security policy of the EC member nations while at the same time functioning as NATO's European pillar. A strong WEU obviously means a WEU that is closely associated with NATO. To operate meaningfully, it would need to be able to use NATO's assets or NATO's assigned forces in cases where NATO does not choose to act. We have offered our assets to the WEU and such double-assignment or double-hatting does not pose any problem so long as the priority for NATO is clearly maintained.

What, nonetheless, we must avoid, is a situation in which NATO and the WEU are compelled always to act together, as if the one fears losing out to the other. Notions of rivalry cannot fail but undermine both organisations and also severely hamper Western military operations in crisis situations. This is especially true of ground and air operations in areas of tension and conflict where a clear command structure is absolutely essential.

Let me say on this subject how encouraged I was by the French Defence Minister's recent speech in Paris in which he proposed greater French participation in NATO structures. If this can be achieved in practice it will clearly make it easier for NATO to play an important role in crisis management while at the same time enabling our European pillar to operate more effectively through the WEU. So given France's interest in creating the European security and defence identity, I would view closer French participation in our Alliance as logical.

Every institution in Europe is evolving rapidly. We are learning that to be successful we have to work through all of these institutions simultaneously. We have to bring their combined assets to bear on any given problem and not be tied by narrow and largely outmoded perceptions of roles and responsibilities inherited from the time of the Cold War.

The Alliance is absolutely crucial to the establishment of a new security order in Europe. NATO needs the support and cooperation of the other major security institutions, but they need us just as much.

First and foremost NATO has kept the United States and Canada engaged in Europe at a time when the change in the geo-strategic situation and the pull of domestic affairs might make many North Americans advocate withdrawal. It is in the interest of the United States and Canada to remain in Europe and even a more cohesive European Community cannot provide stability without them. In Europe as elsewhere, an active American role and leadership is still needed to fashion the response of the international community to crises and challenges. So it would be a major mistake for Europeans to take the